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C O M M E N T  
Building Political Will for Accountable, Equitable 
Trade Policy Making 
introduction 
Trade policy is at an inflection point. Even in the best of times, trade policy 
suffers from systemic dysfunction. International trade policy purports to offer 
broad benefits: economists find that trade increases economic output—or, in lay-
man’s terms, “grows the pie.”
1
 Domestic economic policy is then supposed to 
redistribute those gains equitably. However, American trade policy consistently 
fails at this second step. Foreign competition has disrupted local labor markets, 
leading to greater job churn and lower lifetime income for lower-wage workers.
2
 
The presumptive solution to this problem is Trade Adjustment Assistance 
(TAA), a program to help workers who lose their jobs due to import competi-
tion. Yet Congress persistently underfunds TAA.
3
 The unsurprising result is a 
trade system unpopular among American workers.
4
 
Although President Donald Trump’s trade policy did not create this dysfunc-
tion, events since his election have thrown the problems with our policy-making 
system into sharp relief. The President and relevant agencies, led by the Office 
 
 1 See, How Preferential Trade Agreements Affect the U.S. Economy, CONG. BUDGET OFF. 1-4 (Sept. 
2016), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51924 
-tradeagreements.pdf [https://perma.cc/25PK-D3ZP]. 
2. David H. Autor et al., The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large 
Changes in Trade, 8 ANN. REV. ECON. 205, 229-34 (2016). 
3. Stephen Kim Park, Bridging the Global Governance Gap: Reforming the Law of Trade Adjustment, 
43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 797, 847-48 (2012). 
4. See Jacob Poushter, American Public, Foreign Policy Experts Sharply Disagree over Involvement in 
Global Economy, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016
/10/28/american-public-foreign-policy-experts-sharply-disagree-over-involvement-in 
-global-economy [https://perma.cc/KEM3-9FX7]. 
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of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), have long asserted unitary authority 
over trade policy. This purported authority includes negotiating and exiting 
trade agreements, imposing tariffs, and bringing actions against other countries 
for violations of trade agreements. Enabled by this concentration of power and 
facing little oversight, President Trump has engaged in aggressive trade actions, 
such as imposing tariffs on imported goods and threatening trade wars with ri-
vals and allies alike.
5
 Experts generally believe these efforts are not only harmful 
but irrational: they threaten to imperil the American economy for little gain
6
 and 




5. See, e.g., Scott Horsley, Trump Formally Orders Tariffs on Steel, Aluminum Imports, NPR (Mar. 
8, 2018, 5:00 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/08/591744195/trump-expected-to 
-formally-order-tariffs-on-steel-aluminum-imports [https://perma.cc/4DW4-GUYT]; 
President Trump Approves Relief for U.S. Washing Machine and Solar Cell Manufacturers, OFF. 
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Jan. 22, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press 
-office/press-releases/2018/january/president-trump-approves-relief-us [https://perma.cc
/2C6M-PUL9]; Jim Tankersley & Keith Bradsher, Trump Hits China with Tariffs on $200 Bil-
lion in Goods, Escalating Trade War, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/09/17/us/politics/trump-china-tariffs-trade.html [https://perma.cc/83WQ-PQLS]; 
see also Doug Palmer & Jon McClure, Where We Stand in Trump’s Trade War, POLITICO (July 
9, 2018, 8:00 AM ET), https://www.politico.com/interactives/2018/where-we-stand-in-the 
-trade-war [https://perma.cc/7ZMM-7L5Q] (summarizing tariffs imposed by the United 
States on foreign goods and by foreign countries on U.S. goods). 
6. WORLD BANK GRP., GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, JUNE 2018: THE TURNING OF THE TIDE? 
35-36 (2018) (describing how an escalation of tariffs between the United States and China 
could lead to economic losses in both countries); Dorine Boumans & Carla Krolage, Experts: 
US Tax Reform and Trade Policy Will Negatively Impact World Economy, CESIFO (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/presse/Pressemitteilungen/Pressemitteilungen 
-Archiv/2018/Q2/pm-20180607_US-Handelspolitik.html [https://perma.cc/S3EU-Z9PF] 
(reporting that 66% of 913 economists surveyed worldwide indicated that President Trump’s 
trade policy would hurt the United States). 
7. Nathan Bomey, How President Trump’s Chinese Tariffs Affect American Consumers, USA TODAY 
(July 6, 2018, 1:34 PM ET), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/07/06/president
-trumps-china-tariffs-consumer-impact/762982002 [https://perma.cc/2AD8-D4ZQ] (pre-
dicting that many of the costs of tariffs will be passed on to consumers); Fred Imbert, Red 
States Will Lose the Most in Trade War with China: Citigroup, CNBC (July 6, 2018, 2:48 PM 
ET), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/06/red-states-will-lose-in-china-trade-war-citi.html 
[https://perma.cc/7UJB-KY6J] (reporting that states that voted for then-candidate Trump 
in 2016 have more jobs linked to foreign trade and produce more goods impacted by China’s 
retaliatory tariffs); Danielle Wiener-Bronner, Trump Trade Policies Threaten 2.6 Million U.S. 
Jobs, Chamber of Commerce Says, CNN MONEY (May 31, 2018, 5:56 PM ET), https://money
.cnn.com/2018/05/31/news/chamber-of-commerce-trade-jobs/index.html [https://perma
.cc/3KCU-FF7H] (reporting on a Chamber of Commerce estimate that tariffs will result in 
the loss of millions of jobs among “the very constituents Trump is courting”). 
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In a well-functioning system, the public would pressure Congress to con-
strain the executive; however, traditional mechanisms of democratic accounta-
bility have failed. A dearth of objective information about trade has disenfran-
chised the public and disarmed Congress. Without accurate information from 
trusted sources, the public cannot determine whether the federal government is 
redistributing gains from trade or compensating for trade’s negative effects.
8
 
The public therefore does not effectively petition Congress for redistribution. 
Lacking information and public pressure, Congress has limited ability to redis-
tribute wealth and monitor the executive. 
This democratic deficit has been growing for decades but is now at a break-
ing point. President Trump’s recent attacks on the media and experts have made 
objective truth a site of partisan conflict, making it more difficult for voters to 
assess their self-interest.
9
 Moreover, members of the President’s party fear stand-
ing up to the President—even if they privately oppose the executive’s policies—
because of the potential electoral ramifications.
10
 Voters—lacking or ignoring 
credible information about the effects of different policies—may choose to elect 
representatives whose policies align themselves with a charismatic partisan fig-
ure rather than candidates who align with voters’ interests. This combination of 
a powerful executive and weak interbranch and public checks allows the Presi-
dent to adopt harmful trade policies with little opposition. 
Regardless of the optimal balance of trade-policy objectives, the existing pol-
icy-making process is neither democratic nor just. American trade policy can 
serve different goals: economic growth, efficiency, distribution of wealth, na-
tional security, or some combination thereof. The initial underpinnings of trade 
policy were growth and efficiency. Over time, trade has become a tool of diplo-
macy and national security.
11
 However, even as our goals have changed and de-
veloped, our policy-making system remains insufficiently attuned to the public 
 
8. Interpretations of events—rather than the events themselves—often shape public opinion. In 
these cases, not just the quantity but also the quality of information is critical. BENJAMIN I. 
PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF TRENDS IN AMERICANS’ 
POLICY PREFERENCES 339-41, 354 (2010). 
9. See Americans’ Views on the Media, IPSOS (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news 
-polls/americans-views-media-2018-08-07 [https://perma.cc/5BMF-AVRZ] (finding that 
twenty-nine percent of Americans, including forty-eight percent of Republicans, agree that 
“the news media is the enemy of the American people”). 
10. Jim Tankersley & Ben Casselman, Republicans Opposing Trump on Trade Face Election Quan-
dary, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/business/economy
/republicans-trump-trade.html [https://perma.cc/WK6W-5HDK]. 
11. For example, supporters of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) highlighted its importance to 
American security interests in Asia. See, e.g., Samuel Locklear & John Hamre, Don’t Forget the 
National-Security Case for TPP Trade Deal, WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE (Oct. 23, 2015, 9:57 AM 
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will and lacks the democratic accountability that would legitimate trade policy. 
Our policy-making system should therefore include structural mechanisms that 
empower Congress—the most representative branch of the federal govern-
ment
12
—and pressure it to respond to democratic input. Such changes to the 
process could also lead to changes in policy outcomes: gains from trade remain 
unevenly distributed in part because we lack a mechanism to recognize the po-
litical will of those hurt by trade and make actual—rather than nominal—adjust-
ments, such as reforms to create healthy labor markets. Crucially, these policies 
would better reflect public input. 
Without a system based on democratic support and oversight of trade, the 
United States will continue to subject itself to trade policy that harms workers 
and threatens peace and stability. Getting trade policy right the first time is crit-
ical: trade agreements have long-term (often practically permanent) implica-
tions for domestic law and policy in diverse areas.
13
 To build a better policy-
making system, the United States must rethink how it enters into agreements 
and manages its existing commitments. Without mechanisms to force discus-
sion about the distributional consequences of trade, the federal government has 
little incentive—and the public, little ability—to make corrections that will ben-
efit Americans broadly. 
Given that our long-teetering trade system is under threat of collapse, how 
do we move forward? The Trump Presidency has emphasized the need for re-
form, which should include efforts to catalyze political pressure to produce more 
democratic trade policy. In response to this need, this Comment proposes that 
Congress establish a nonpartisan, expert body to produce public-facing trade 
analysis: the Congressional Office on Trade Analysis (COTA). This body, based 
on similar bodies Congress has created in the domestic context such as the Con-
gressional Budget Office (CBO), would lead to more equitable and democrati-
cally legitimate trade policy. 
 
ET), https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/10/23/dont-forget-the-national-security-case 
-for-tpp-trade-deal [https://perma.cc/4M8Z-SCSB]. These appeals failed to save the agree-
ment but demonstrate the close link between modern trade agreements and national-security 
interests. 
12. “Most representative” is of course a relative term. Reforms in areas such as campaign finance, 
voter access, and redistricting could enhance Congress’s democratic responsiveness. 
13. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431-32 (1920) (discussing the implications of the Mi-
gratory Bird Treaty Act); ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM 223 
(2011) (discussing the effects of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
World Trade Organization (WTO) on domestic regulation). See generally SUSAN K. SELL, PRI-
VATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003) 
(discussing the rise in importance of intellectual property law in international trade agree-
ments). 
accountable, equitable trade policy making 
1443 
COTA’s primary goal would be to enhance democratic accountability by 
shifting power in the policy-making process away from the executive and to-
wards Congress and the public. Two primary factors would facilitate this goal: 
(1) increased availability of information for Congress to assess trade policy, lead-
ing to (2) increased information dissemination to the American public. Although 
my proposal is process oriented—emphasizing democratic input—and outcome 
neutral, COTA could have policy effects such as increasing redistribution. 
Though such an institution alone cannot repair our broken trade policy, it is a 
necessary reform for restoring the credibility of information and ensuring that 
information is available to political actors and advocates. 
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part I outlines how the President has 
come to dominate the trade policy-making system. Part II explains the patholo-
gies of the current system and argues that Congress should ensure trade com-
mitments are understandable to the voting public to increase political accounta-
bility. Finally, Part III proposes creating a new office, COTA, to conduct trade 
analysis with the aim of promoting the public interest. 
i .  the evolution of the trade policy-making process 
This Part traces the evolution of trade policy making from the partnership 
model at the Founding to the executive-led model of today. In particular, Con-
gress has abdicated its designated role by (1) elevating the President in trade ne-
gotiations; (2) expediting the adoption of agreements; and (3) failing to exercise 
oversight. This long-term trend of abdication has ultimately set the stage for the 
unilateral actions that President Trump has taken on trade. 
The Constitution assigns Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations”
14
 and conditions presidential treaty power on the approval of 
two-thirds of the Senate.
15
 The Framers imposed the supermajority requirement 
to ensure significant congressional deliberation over international agreements.
16
 
But the balance of power has shifted toward the President.
17
 Congress has dele-
gated significant international negotiating discretion to the President, beginning 
with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.
18
 The 1934 Act granted ex 
 
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
15. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
16. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 358-61 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
17. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International Law, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1206-44 (2018); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 
U.S. 304 (1936) (granting the President broad deference in foreign affairs). 
18. Act of June 12, 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (2018)). 
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ante authorization, allowing the President to reduce tariffs within a specific 
range. However, Congress eventually supplanted this process with one in which 
Congress ratified agreements after the executive made them.19 Presidents them-
selves hastened this shift by ignoring congressional restraints. After Congress 
granted President Kennedy negotiating authority, he entered into agreements 
that extended beyond the authority delegated by Congress.
20
 Congress has also 
delegated powers outside of trade negotiations. For example, the President can 




Concurrent with this delegation to the President, Congress has shifted its 
procedures to expand trade policy’s reach and to favor the executive. First, it has 
mostly abandoned Article II treaties in favor of Article I congressional-executive 
agreements.
22
 Congressional-executive agreements are passed like domestic leg-
islation and require simple majorities in both chambers of Congress and the sig-
nature of the President. This change has produced a massive expansion in inter-
national commercial agreements.
23
 Second, Congress has adopted “fast-track” 
procedures.
24
 Originally introduced in the Trade Act of 1974, fast track provides 
for a majority vote in each chamber of Congress with no amendments on the day 
the President introduces the bill.
25
 These procedural changes, combined with 
presidential discretion in foreign relations, have allowed executive-branch pref-




19. Cory Adkins & David Singh Grewal, Two Views of International Trade in the Constitutional Or-
der, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1495, 1499-1503 (2016); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Pre-
sent, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1298-1301 
(2008); see Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
799, 824, 827, 847-51 (1995). 
20. Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to Beyond, 29 GEO. 
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 687, 698 (1996). 
21. E.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1862, 2132; 50 U.S.C. §§ 1702, 4305(b) (2018). 
22. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER 
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 195 (1990); Hathaway, supra note 19, at 1298-1301. 
23. See generally Ackerman & Golove, supra note 19 (exploring the constitutionality of interna-
tional accords like NAFTA, which was approved as a congressional-executive agreement). 
24. Hathaway, supra note 19, at 1304-05. 
25. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 151-153, 88 Stat. 1978, 2001-08 (1975) (codified at 
19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2193) 
26. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation of 
Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 349 (2003) (arguing that there 
is a separation-of-powers concern where “the legislature statutizes the rules of debate, [giv-
ing] the president a say in a sphere of activity where, constitutionally speaking, he should 
have no voice”). 
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To counter the growth of executive power in international trade, modern 
Congresses have conditioned fast-track procedures on compliance with congres-
sional oversight.
27





 and the provision of information to 
members of Congress upon request.
30
 If Congress determines that the executive 
branch has not complied with its obligations, Congress can withdraw its dele-
gated authority.
31
 These efforts have had mixed results. Although congressional 
staff have indicated dissatisfaction with the executive’s consultations with Con-
gress,
32
 Congress has never withdrawn its authority on procedural grounds.
33
 
Meanwhile, Congress has decimated its own capacity to conduct policy analysis 
and monitor the executive. As part of Newt Gingrich’s campaign to centralize 
power in the Speaker’s office and reduce opposition to his policies, he slashed 
the budgets and staff of committees and expert bodies in the 1990s.
34
 Subse-
quent Congresses have failed to restore these staffing levels. From 1994 to 2015, 
the number of committee staff in both houses has fallen by a third, and the com-
bined staffs of key congressional-support agencies have shrunk by nearly forty 
percent.
35
 Accordingly, in its current oversight role, Congress often lacks the au-
thority and ability to deliberate over trade goals. 
 
27. For a longer explanation of oversight provisions, see Margaret M. Kim, Trade Promotion Au-
thority: Evaluating the Necessity of Congressional Oversight and Accountability, 40 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 317, 336-42 (2016). 
28. 19 U.S.C. §§ 4204-4205. 
29. Id. § 3804. 
30. Id. § 4203. 
31. Id. § 4205. 
32. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-59, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: AN ANALYSIS OF 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND CONGRESSIONAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR CONSULTATIONS UNDER 
TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY 43-46 (2007) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
33. See Kim, supra note 27, at 343. 
34. Bruce Bartlett, Gingrich and the Destruction of Congressional Expertise, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX 
(Nov. 29, 2011, 6:00 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/gingrich-and 
-the-destruction-of-congressional-expertise [https://perma.cc/257G-HS6M]. 
35. Vital Statistics on Congress: Data on the U.S. Congress, BROOKINGS ch. 5 at 10-11 (May 21, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/vitalstats_ch5_full.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6YFN-85WD]. The agencies included in the forty percent figure are the Govern-
ment Accountability Office, Congressional Budget Office, and Congressional Research Ser-
vice. 
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i i .  the consequences of today’s trade policy-making 
system 
The executive-led model of trade creates law not through congressional de-
liberation and public accountability, but rather through an executive influenced 
by special interests. This Part examines the problem created by the current trade 
policy-making system, wherein weak congressional checks have resulted in ever-
greater executive authority. This problem has resulted in two primary patholo-
gies: (1) the outsized influence that private interests wield over the executive’s 
conduct in trade policy; and (2) weakened democratic accountability. This Part 
concludes by arguing that executive accountability is insufficient to counter these 
negative consequences. These problems create a system that does not serve broad 
public interests like the fair distribution of gains from trade.
36
 To correct this 
structural failure, Congress and the public need the analysis of an independent, 
nonpartisan congressional body. 
A. Weak Congressional Checks 
Congress remains at a disadvantage in monitoring executive authority in in-
ternational trade policy. It lacks the institutional knowledge and expertise nec-
essary to understand and check the executive during trade negotiations. The ex-
ecutive controls the flow of information to the legislative branch and has the 
power to set the agenda for negotiations. A majority of congressional staff sur-
veyed believe that they “[do] not have any real input or influence on the trade 
negotiations,” despite USTR’s required consultations.
37
 Moreover, several staff 
reported that USTR briefings had omitted important information and that they 
often did not know to ask specific questions about critical changes to agreement 
text.
38
 The knowledge gap widens when national-security classifications reduce 
access—as they did with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
39
 This infor-
mation asymmetry is particularly problematic because USTR is invested in its 
 
36. See, e.g., Dave Johnson, “Free Trade”: The Elites Are Selling It but the Public Is No Longer Buying, 
HUFFPOST (Mar. 11, 2016, 2:26 PM ET), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/dave-johnson
/free-trade-the-elites-are_b_9441498.html [https://perma.cc/5MM7-VZCV]. 
37. GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 43. 
38. Id. at 45-46. 
39. Adkins & Grewal, supra note 19, at 1511-12. 
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own policies and therefore has an incentive to overstate their benefits and mini-
mize their negative consequences.
40
 
Yet Congress’s powers to check the executive’s trade policy when members 
feel misled or underinformed are limited. Congress can theoretically withhold 
fast track’s advantages by letting the authority expire or finding the executive in 
noncompliance with statutory procedural requirements. However, Congress has 
never actually voted down a trade agreement on procedural grounds.
41
 If Con-
gress had more information about a proposed trade policy’s effect, its members 
might feel more confident holding the President accountable for procedural 
faults. Free trade does not always increase economic growth and lower consumer 
prices, but Congress struggles to identify such situations. Congress needs its 
own source of analysis to understand trade policy and corroborate the executive’s 
claims. 
Information is not always sufficient: even when aware that the executive is 
pursuing unwise trade policy, members of Congress—particularly those of the 
President’s party—may not constrain the President for fear of the political ram-
ifications. This phenomenon has become particularly apparent during the 
Trump Presidency. Although individual Republican members of Congress have 
expressed misgivings about President Trump’s actions on trade, Congress as a 
whole has failed to act.
42
 Members may be afraid to oppose an unorthodox Pres-
ident who may characterize actions calculated to serve the national interest as an 
attack on him and his base. Partisan gerrymandering and political polarization 
mean that legislators viewed as disloyal to the President or his party are likely to 
be subject to a primary challenge.
43
 Absent countervailing pressure, legislators 
may therefore tolerate unsound trade policy to preserve their electoral chances. 
A congressional institution that provides trade analysis could help reduce 
concerns about partisanship and encourage congressional checks. With more re-
liable, public information, legislators can predict trade policy’s effects and offer 
 
40. See ROBERT HOWSE, How to Begin to Think About the “Democratic Deficit” at the WTO, in THE 
WTO SYSTEM: LAW, POLITICS & LEGITIMACY 57, 63 (2007). 
41. Kim, supra note 27, at 343. 
42. Kevin Breuninger, 107 House Republicans Send Letter to Trump Asking Him Not to Do His Tariff 
Plan, CNBC (Mar. 8, 2018, 11:42 AM EST), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/07/107-house 
-republicans-express-opposition-to-broad-tariffs-call-on-trump-to-only-target-bad-actors
.html [https://perma.cc/3SFA-D9VH]; Burgess Everett, ‘I’d Like to Kill ’em’: GOP Takes on 
Trump Tariffs, POLITICO (July 3, 2018, 5:05 AM EDT), https://www.politico.com/story/2018
/07/03/trump-tariffs-republicans-congress-hatch-687911 [https://perma.cc/5Z8X-G3UZ]. 
43. See, e.g., John Verhovek & Kendall Karson, Sanford Loss Magnifies ‘Trump Effect’ on GOP Pri-
maries, ABC NEWS (June 13, 2018, 11:31 AM ET), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Sanford 
-loss-magnifies-trump-effect-gop-primaries/story?id=55862833 [https://perma.cc/W9SQ 
-FP26]. 
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principled reasons to support or oppose particular trade policies. For example, a 
senator who opposes the President’s policies can reduce the appearance of parti-
sanship by justifying her decision based on the policies’ harm to particular con-
stituents, such as farmers or manufacturing workers. In essence, independent, 
objective analysis of trade’s effects can provide political cover to members of 
Congress—especially members of the President’s party—who oppose the execu-
tive’s trade policy. Voters can then evaluate the member’s policy justifications.
44
 
Moreover, releasing objective, expert analysis about the effects of trade policy 
can provide an impetus for external pressure. Opinion leaders, such as academic 
institutions, advocacy groups, and the media, can disseminate accurate infor-
mation to voters who can hold politicians accountable.
45
 
Some may raise a counterargument against increased congressional influence 
on separation-of-powers grounds, arguing that such influence would infringe 
on executive power. But subjecting trade policy to greater congressional scrutiny 
does not interfere with the President’s authority over foreign relations.
46
 Greater 
congressional involvement can serve as a counterweight to presidential policy 
preferences and special interests that may have negative effects on the public and 
workers. The critique that such congressional involvement in trade interferes 
with the President’s authority assumes (1) that trade policy implicates “foreign 
affairs;” and (2) that the President should have unitary control over foreign af-
fairs. Both assumptions are questionable. 
First, modern international trade policy has significant domestic effects, re-
sulting in a weaker linkage to the typical justifications for executive control over 
foreign affairs.
47
 Louis Fisher contends that a clear line between foreign and do-
 
44. Even in partisan contexts, voters can develop reasoned policy views with more policy infor-
mation. See Cheryl Boudreau & Scott A. MacKenzie, Informing the Electorate? How Party Cues 
and Policy Information Affect Public Opinion About Initiatives, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 48, 60 (2014); 
John G. Bullock, Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate, 105 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 496, 512-13 (2011). 
45. See PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 364. 
46. See KOH, supra note 22, at 204-06 (arguing that interbranch friction in foreign affairs pro-
motes the Constitution’s vision of separation of powers). 
47. For a more extended discussion of this point, see Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade 
and the Separation of Powers, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 48-51), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3136086 (outlining the “domestic economics” and “foreign af-
fairs” paradigms of trade law and arguing that, while the latter paradigm has dominated since 
the mid-twentieth century, trade law has become increasingly divisive and contentious since 
the Cold War). 
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mestic affairs has never existed.
48
 At the very least, foreign affairs and the do-
mestic economy are closely connected and becoming more so.
49
 This shift has 
begun to erode the justifications for the treatment of foreign policy as an excep-
tional area under executive control.
50
 Trade is at the forefront of this shift. Rather 
than being concerned with the relationships among sovereigns, modern trade 
agreements focus on regulations traditionally understood as domestic in nature, 
such as environmental and labor standards. 
Second, an executive with unilateral authority over foreign affairs is neither 
inevitable nor constitutionally required. Such a position ignores the text of the 
Constitution, such as Congress’s express power “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations.”
51
 As political scientist Edward Corwin noted, “the Constitu-
tion . . . is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American for-
eign policy.”
52
 Congress and the public have begun to dispute the President’s 
unilateral authority. For example, Congress prohibits providing direct assistance 
to a foreign government if its democratic government has been overthrown by a 
military coup.
53
 When the Obama Administration attempted to avoid this re-
striction by not declaring formally that a coup had occurred in Egypt in 2013, 
critical media coverage forced (at least partial) compliance with the statute.
54
 
B. Influential Private Interests 
The executive branch’s increasing influence over trade policy is particularly 
concerning given industry’s influence over USTR—the agency that advises the 
President on trade policy—and the content of trade agreements. This influence 
threatens the democratic legitimacy of the trade system by elevating corporate 
interests over those of the American public and leading to policy with negative 
distributional consequences for workers. The Trade Act of 1974 requires the ex-
ecutive branch to consult with Industry Trade Advisory Committees (ITACs) of 
 
48. LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER 307 (2014); see also 
KOH, supra note 22, at 211 (arguing that foreign affairs has never been a “realm 
apart . . . [where] checks and balances [do] not apply”). 
49. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1672 
(1997). 
50. See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. 
L. REV. 1897 (2015). 
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
52. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 200 (2d ed. 1941). 
53. See Note, Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance to Post-Coup States, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2499, 
2502-03 (2014). 
54. Id. at 2508-09. 
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private-sector advisors during negotiations over trade agreements.
55
 The ITACs 
have outsized influence in the negotiating process. During negotiations over the 
TPP, for example, ITAC members had access to proposed drafts—even when 
members of Congress and their staff did not.
56
 Nearly six hundred industry ex-
ecutives and lobbyists had extensive access to and influence over the draft text of 
the TPP.
57
 ITACs’ membership also privileges particular industries such as phar-
maceuticals and financial services.
58
 ITACs’ involvement thus entangles private 
interests with those of USTR and the President.
59
 
This influence leads to negotiating positions and outcomes that prioritize 
special interests. During TPP negotiations, for example, USTR produced pro-
posals highly protective of pharmaceutical patents.
60
 These provisions would 
have strengthened pharmaceutical monopolies, granted intellectual property 
rights holders the power to sue sovereign governments for lost future profits, 
 
55. 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (2018); Industry Trade Advisory Center, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., https://www
.trade.gov/itac [https://perma.cc/VB56-GS4J]. 
56. 161 CONG. REC. S3210 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (statement of Sen. Warren) (describing how 
members of Congress had limited access to the text of TPP and how even those who had 
access were subject to limitations on public disclosure); William New, Confidential USTR 
Emails Show Close Industry Involvement in TPP Negotiations, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (May 6, 
2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/06/05/confidential-ustr-emails-show-close-industry
-involvement-in-tpp-negotiations [https://perma.cc/6ZKH-VW42]. 
57. George Zornick, Congress Is Sick of the Secrecy Around the TPP, NATION (Aug. 20, 2015), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/congress-is-sick-of-the-secrecy-around-tpp [https://
perma.cc/492T-R5LB]. 
58. Christopher Ingraham & Howard Schneider, Industry Voices Dominate the Trade Advisory Sys-
tem, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/business
/trade-advisory-committees. The influence that these particular industries exert over Ameri-
can policy is well documented. See, e.g., Theodore T. Lee et al., The Politics of Medicare and 
Drug-Price Negotiation (Updated), HEALTHAFFAIRS (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs
.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160919.056632/full [https://perma.cc/3FZ9-F64Z]; Gautam 
Mukunda, The Price of Wall Street’s Power, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 2014), https://hbr.org/2014
/06/the-price-of-wall-streets-power [https://perma.cc/N4M2-PWUE]. 
59. Adkins & Grewal, supra note 19, at 1515; see also Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of Interna-
tional Intellectual Property Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 988-1005, 
1015-31 (2014) (discussing the influence of private interests on intellectual property law in 
U.S. trade agreements); Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 47 (manuscript at 50) (arguing that 
private interests’ “privileged access translate[s] into privileged outcomes”). 
60. Brook K. Baker, Trans-Pacific Partnership Provisions in Intellectual Property, Transparency, and 
Investment Chapters Threaten Access to Medicines in the US and Elsewhere, PLOS MED. 2 (Mar. 
8, 2016), https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pmed
.1001970&type=printable [https://perma.cc/X3HA-HTWG]. 
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and given industry opportunities to influence and challenge government deci-
sions whether to reimburse for pharmaceuticals and medical devices; the result 
would have reduced global access to medicines.
61
 
This private influence is particularly concerning when corporate interests 
pursue what they cannot achieve domestically through international law. One 
TPP provision proposed by USTR—a twelve-year data exclusivity period for bi-
ologic drugs—was even inconsistent with President Obama’s budget, which 
proposed decreasing the U.S. data exclusivity period to seven years.
62
 Although 
some of these provisions were not included in the final negotiated text of the 
TPP,
63
 USTR pursued similar provisions in NAFTA renegotiations.
64
 The 




Access to USTR and proposed text allows special interests to use the opera-
tions of the trade regime to their advantage by capturing trade policy within the 
executive branch.
66
 This dynamic contrasts with other contexts like the budget, 
where broad public access to proposals and objective analysis can balance the 
lobbying power of special interests. Although equity and distribution do not al-
ways triumph in domestic budgeting or tax, advocacy organizations and think 
 
61. Id. at 3-5. 
62. Amy Kapczynski, The Trans-Pacific Partnership—Is It Bad for Your Health?, 373 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 201, 202 (2015). Some attempts to extend market exclusivity can violate antitrust law. 
See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 147-48 (2013); Cecilia (Yixi) Cheng & Theodore 
T. Lee, When Patents Are Sovereigns: The Competitive Harms of Leasing Tribal Immunity, 127 
YALE L.J.F. 848 (2018), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/when-patents-are-sovereigns 
[https://perma.cc/LX9P-AAF3] (arguing that attempts to use tribal sovereign immunity to 
shield patents from challenge and extend market exclusivity violate antitrust law). However, 
existing antitrust doctrine generally shields lobbying from liability. See, e.g., United Mine 
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr 
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961). 
63. See TPP Final Table of Contents, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade 
-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma
.cc/BY66-2QBW]. 
64. See Renegotiating NAFTA: Threats to Affordable Medicines, PUB. CITIZEN (Mar. 23, 2018), 
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/a2m_nafta_fact_sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc
/KH49-9TEB]. 
65. Alexander Bolton, Trump’s New NAFTA Faces Uphill Battle in Congress, HILL (Dec. 1, 2018, 
7:45 PM ET), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/trade/419222-trumps-new-nafta-faces 
-uphill-battle-in-congress [https://perma.cc/WJ8E-2NGR]. 
66. See Kaminski, supra note 59, at 992-1003 (describing how private industry can use access and 
relationships to capture the U.S. trade regime, which is vulnerable due to its lack of procedural 
and transparency protections). 
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tanks can at least put political pressure on Congress to consider these values 
when legislating. 
Broader access to information about trade policy could involve groups that 
are currently excluded but would provide a countervailing force to the ITACs. 
These groups could influence congressional votes or demand domestic distribu-
tional legislation as a condition for supporting an international trade agreement. 
Because members of Congress are beholden to more local interests, these inter-
ests—such as labor unions and small businesses—may have a better chance of 
gaining political influence through one of the 535 voting members of Congress 
than through the executive branch.
67
 This pluralistic balance could prevent the 
dominance of large corporate interests or at least mitigate their preferred policies 
and alleviate concerns about private capture. 
Some may argue against increased congressional influence on public-choice 
grounds, worrying that Congress has little incentive to fix the trade system. Con-
gress may avoid accountability for trade policy just as easily as the President and 
is subject to manipulation by the same special-interest groups. However, I argue 
that an expert congressional body mitigates these concerns: COTA could help 
members win reelection by highlighting opportunities to aid in redistribution to 
their constituents and exposing the process to a different set of interest groups, 
who may themselves promote redistribution efforts or who will, at the very least, 
balance industry lobbying. 
Proponents of public choice might argue that Congress will shirk a greater 
role in trade policy making because trade policy can yield diffuse benefits and 
concentrated harms. The public-choice economic model assumes that political 
actors are primarily self-interested. One assumption underlying this model is 
that legislators’ primary motivation is reelection.
68
 In theory, legislators want to 
avoid being accountable for laws and policies that harm interest groups that may 
retaliate. Congress therefore prefers to pass laws with concentrated benefits and 
diffuse costs (such as channeling tax breaks or grants to constituents), and to 
 
67. Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 47 (manuscript at 44-45). 
68. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 37-66 
(2d ed. 1989); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 11-77 (1974). It 
is important to note that public choice has its limits. In their review of the empirical evidence, 
Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey conclude that the economic view does not fully explain leg-
islator behavior. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION 12-33 (1991). Legislators often have motivations other than reelection, such as 
public service, personal aggrandizement, or ideology. See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESS-
MEN IN COMMITTEES 1-15 (1973). 
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not pass laws with diffuse benefits and concentrated harms (such as taking ac-
tion in foreign policy).
69
 
My response to the public-choice counterargument is that in today’s global-
ized world, a self-interested Congress has an incentive to anticipate the potential 
future preferences of voters and rely on an expert body on trade. R. Douglas 
Arnold argues that members of Congress not only respond to existing policy 
preferences but also anticipate the opinions that citizens might hold in the fu-
ture.
70
 Trade has become one of the country’s most salient economic issues. Be-
cause Congress cannot delegate all trade decisions to the executive, and voters 
may not distinguish between the two branches’ policies without additional in-
formation, future voters may retaliate against legislators for what they perceive 
to be negative trade outcomes. This creates an incentive for Congress to support 
a body that provides reliable information on trade policy. 
Such a body may help members of Congress win reelection by helping them 
identify the constituents and industries that will be hurt by trade. Legislators can 
then channel benefits to these groups to mitigate trade’s negative effects, offset-
ting the risk to reelection. Information about how trade policy is affecting jobs 
(as opposed to trends such as automation) may also give members of Congress 
the opportunity to shift blame credibly from trade policy to other factors. Mem-
bers of Congress that represent those hurt by trade can then negotiate with col-
leagues. Practically speaking, members’ power to forge deals will vary depending 
on political dynamics; however, when their votes are key to passage these mem-
bers can use their leverage to seek mitigating actions. Although Congress may 
not have an incentive to participate in all areas of the international sphere, addi-
tional information can prevent trade policy from becoming a liability in future 
elections. 
Even though Congress itself is also subject to special interests, a greater role 
for the legislative branch could ultimately provide a counterweight to the ITACs. 
The reality in modern international negotiations is that Congress has little influ-
ence in the final text of trade agreements, so there is little threat Congress will 
add giveaways to specific interests to an agreement itself. A more likely conse-
quence is that smaller constituencies not currently represented in trade policy 
making would have the opportunity to influence congressional votes or demand 
domestic distributional legislation as part of a legislative package that includes 
the international agreement. 
 
69. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for 
Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285-89 (1988); see also I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN 
TRADE POLITICS 14-16 (4th ed. 2005) (describing congressional delegation of trade policy 
making to overcome this problem). 
70. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 10-11 (1990). 
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C. Little Democratic Accountability 
The trade policy-making system ultimately suffers from a lack of democratic 
accountability. In this context, a democratically accountable system is one in 
which voters can meaningfully influence the policy process so that it produces 
outcomes that further their goals. This definition of democratic accountability 
relies on what political scientists Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro call “collec-
tive deliberation,” a system in which the public uses information and helpful in-
terpretations to form policy preferences that correspond to its needs and val-
ues.
71
 Democratic accountability requires voters to have (1) actionable 
information that allows them to evaluate whether elected officials are acting in 
their interest;
72
and (2) the opportunity to affect policy outcomes. 
In the American collective-deliberation system, organizations such as gov-
ernment bodies, universities, think tanks, and private industry produce relevant 
information and analyses.
73
 Another set of individuals and organizations inter-
prets this information, which is then transmitted to the public by mass media 
and through social networks.
74
 The public can then base its votes on accurate, 
independent information about the policies that candidates support, rather than 
empty promises about those policies’ effects. Political science research demon-
strates that policy information helps voters make better choices—even in parti-
san environments.
75
 This information thus exposes and punishes policies that 
are hypocritical or irrational. 
Our current trade policy-making process, however, suffers from a structural 
failure of democratic accountability: traditional means of holding politicians ac-
countable—such as public deliberation, elections, and partisan friction—are in-
adequate without sufficient information. Although Congress has attempted to 
combat this problem by conditioning fast-track approval on executive compli-
ance, these efforts have largely been ineffective.
76
 Moreover, these provisions do 
not help the public understand the effects of international commercial agree-
ments or hold Congress accountable for their votes. 
 
71. PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 363, 365. 
72. Id. at 363 (“The point of democracy is not merely responsiveness of government policy to 
citizens’ preferences but responsiveness to well-informed preferences, which accurately reflect 
the basic needs and values of the citizenry.”). 
73. Id. at 364. 
74. Id. at 364-65. 
75. Boudreau & MacKenzie, supra note 44; Bullock, supra note 44. 
76. See supra Section II.A. 
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The public can typically engage in policy making through real-time moni-
toring. For example, constituents can effectively pressure members of Congress 
by showing up to town halls, calling members’ offices, and protesting.
77
 How-
ever, uncertainty about the effects of trade, coupled with inadequate time for 
analysis and dissemination, prevents the public understanding required for pub-
lic engagement. The latest fast-track reauthorization requires publication of ne-
gotiated text before the President enters into an agreement.
78
 However, trans-
parency postnegotiations cannot help the public influence the negotiations 
themselves. 
To hold members of Congress accountable through elections, the public 
must understand what Congress voted for and how such policies led to certain 
outcomes. Recent empirical work suggests that information about the distribu-
tional effects of trade barriers can help achieve this accountability.
79
 However, an 
election devoid of information about candidates’ and parties’ performances fails 
to provide accountability. Because trade policy is complex and information about 
its outcomes scarce, elections alone are insufficient in the current policy-making 
process. Although President Trump was elected in part because of his opposition 
to trade liberalization, his victory will not necessarily result in the pursuit of pol-
icies that will benefit his anti-trade liberalization voters. Election winners must 
continue to be subjected to discipline at the ballot box, which requires infor-
mation about their performance.
80
 
Finally, we cannot rely on the party system to ensure accountability. Increas-
ing partisanship in American politics may lead to a focus on the roles of parties 
rather than the balance of power between branches.
81
 One could argue that the 
 
77. See Indivisible: A Practical Guide for Resisting the Trump Agenda, INDIVISIBLE 3, 10-11, 16-25 
(2017), https://www.indivisible.org/resource/guide-english-pdf/wpdmdl=1777 [https://
perma.cc/4KGT-XBNK]. 
78. 19 U.S.C. § 4205 (2018). 
79. See generally Sungmin Rho & Michael Tomz, Why Don’t Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-
Interest?, 71 INT’L ORG. SUPPLEMENT S85 (2017) (finding that information about trade’s dis-
tributional effects makes people more likely to express self-serving policy preferences and 
more sensitive to the needs of others). 
80. Id. at S91-102 (showing that many voters are not aware of the economic effects of trade policy 
and that their preferences change when informed); cf. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 17, at 
1284-85 (discussing the impact of electoral incentives and public attention on Congress’s over-
sight of the President). 
81. When the government is unified under one party, competition between the executive and leg-
islative branches “may all but disappear,” requiring reconsideration of separation-of-powers 
doctrine and theory. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2315 (2006). 
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increasing prevalence of straight-ticket voting
82
 links the electoral chances of the 
two branches, making democratic accountability in both political branches 
moot. However, members of Congress often disagree with the foreign policy of 
presidents from their own party. During the Obama Administration, rifts 
opened between many Democratic senators and the President on foreign pol-
icy.
83
 Democratic Senators Elizabeth Warren
84
 and Bernie Sanders
85
 were out-
spoken critics of the TPP. President Trump has also faced criticism from Repub-
lican members of Congress for his foreign policy positions and conduct.
86
 Since 
party identification does not always predict positions on trade, we should distin-
guish between the branches when evaluating accountability for trade policy. 
Although public dissemination of information is critical to democratic ac-
countability, some commentators argue that trade policy should be subject to 
strict secrecy.
87
 The first worry is that disclosures to Congress and the public may 
reveal negotiation positions and strategies, thereby handicapping USTR nego-
tiators. The second worry is that more transparency will chill negotiations. In 
theory, confidentiality lubricates negotiations by allowing parties to discuss po-
tential positions without justifying these decisions to the public before they are 
final. 
 
82. See Amber Phillips, Is Split-Ticket Voting Officially Dead?, WASH. POST: FIX (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/17/is-split-ticket-voting 
-officially-dead [https://perma.cc/9QC7-DDSL]. 
83. Jackson Diehl, Opinion, Obama’s Fight with His Own Party over Foreign Policy, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jackson-diehl-obamas-fight 
-with-his-own-party-over-foreign-policy/2015/02/01/10ece938-a7e4-11e4-a2b2-776095f393
b2_story.html [https://perma.cc/FB85-ATH2]. 
84. Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute 
-settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274
-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html [https://perma.cc/S6MQ-2YH4]. 
85. Bernie Sanders, The TPP Must Be Defeated, HUFFPOST: BLOG (May 21, 2016), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/rep-bernie-sanders/the-tpp-must-be-defeated_b_7352166.html 
[https://perma.cc/SU9X-VPSX]. Though technically an independent, Senator Sanders cau-
cuses with the Democratic Party. 
86. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, John McCain Just Systematically Dismantled Donald Trump’s Entire 
Worldview, WASH. POST: FIX (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the 
-fix/wp/2017/02/17/john-mccain-just-systematically-dismantled-donald-trumps-entire 
-worldview [https://perma.cc/6GNH-CBVF]; Sasse Statement on Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, 
U.S. SENATOR FOR NEB. BEN SASSE (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.sasse.senate.gov/public 
/index.cfm/2018/3/sasse-statement-on-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs [https://perma.cc
/86TX-HTX2]. 
87. See, e.g., Benjamin A. Field & Kian J. Hudson, The Bonds of Peace: A Defense of the National 
Security Perspective on Trade, 42 N.C. J. INT’L L. 307, 341, 362-63 (2017). 
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The first worry overstates the existence of secrecy in actual trade negotia-
tions. Advocates for greater transparency have focused primarily on access to 
draft language. Because USTR’s foreign counterparts already have access to draft 
language, releasing this draft text—as opposed to negotiators’ notes or strate-
gies—would not undermine the United States’ negotiating position relative to 
its foreign counterparts.
88
 Special interests such as ITACs’ membership of nearly 
six hundred industry executives and lobbyists have also had broad access to text 
during negotiations.
89
 Moreover, partners such as the European Union volun-
tarily release information about their proposals and negotiating positions.
90
 This 
information is not “secret” but instead hidden in the U.S. system from members 
of Congress and, derivatively, the general public. 
The second worry assumes that confidentiality in trade negotiations pro-
motes agreement. However, this argument misses the point. Secrecy’s benefits 
arise primarily by excluding the public’s input, which reduces the ability of the 
public to check special interests. Lubrication is only positive insofar as the ma-
chinery of the trade policy-making system produces outcomes consistent with 
the public’s preferences. Secrecy may also be unnecessary for agreement. This 
debate stretches back to the Founding. While Publius recognized the need for 
secrecy in all treaty negotiations,
91
 the Federal Farmer drew a distinction be-
tween “treaties of peace and alliance,” which benefit from secrecy but do not in-
terfere with domestic laws, and “commercial treaties,” which do not require se-
crecy.
92
 Many modern commentators remain unconvinced that all trade 
 
88. See Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 47 (manuscript at 42-43). 
89. See supra Section II.B. 
90. Margot E. Kaminski, Don’t Keep the Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/opinion/dont-keep-trade-talks-secret.html 
[https://perma.cc/D6U8-2M38]; see, e.g., EU Negotiating Texts in TTIP, EUROPEAN COMMIS-
SION (July 27, 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230 [https://
perma.cc/UH84-W6NS]. It is insufficient, however, for U.S. media and advocacy groups to 
rely exclusively on the European Union’s transparency policy since the European Union is 
only one of many trade partners. Congressional influence over U.S. trade policy generally 
would therefore require disclosures by the executive branch. 
91. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 16, at 360 (“It seldom happens in the negotiation of trea-
ties, of whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate despatch are sometimes requi-
site.”). 
92. Federal Farmer, Letter XI (Jan. 10, 1788), in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFI-
CATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 301, 308-310 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
1995); see also Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 47 (manuscript at 41-42). 
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agreements should be protected by high levels of secrecy.
93
 Given their resem-
blance to domestic legislation, modern trade agreements could be subjected to 
increased transparency without endangering national security.
94
 
Traditional mechanisms of democratic accountability have failed. We need a 
new institution to galvanize the public to pressure Congress to act. Without 
COTA, the public will continue to lack the information necessary to mobilize. 
D. Why Powerful Executives Do Not Provide Accountability 
Even in the best of times, democratic accountability for the President is in-
sufficient to address these pathologies. As I discuss below, the President repre-
sents a smaller proportion of the American public than does Congress as a whole 
due to the vagaries of the Electoral College. Moreover, the President cannot pro-
tect the regional interests that the Founders intended to serve and is particularly 
unaccountable for his or her trade policy given the lack of judicial review in this 
context. 
Admittedly, there are some benefits to the trade policy-making system’s in-
stallation of a powerful executive. As then-Professor Elena Kagan famously ar-
gued, “presidential administration” can make the federal government more ef-
fective and accountable.
95
 In the context of foreign relations, the argument for 
executive control is often even stronger, given the branch’s intelligence and di-
plomacy apparatuses as well as the expertise of the federal bureaucracy.
96
 The 
President can often act more quickly, with greater flexibility, and in a manner 
that preserves secrecy.
97
 While these points may be well taken with respect to the 
administrative state, they do not overcome the pathologies of the current trade 
policy-making system. 
National democratic accountability is far from assured. The President does 
not always serve broad national interests and may in fact “cater to a narrower 
 
93. See, e.g., Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 47 (manuscript at 42-43); John C. Yoo, Treaties and 
Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
2218, 2241 & n.85 (1999). 
94. Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 50, at 1940-42. 
95. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331-46 (2001). 
96. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1608-09 (2016). 
97. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015) (“Between the two po-
litical branches, only the Executive has the characteristic of unity at all times. And with unity 
comes the ability to exercise, to a greater degree, ‘[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.’” 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 16, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton))). 
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geographic and population constituency than . . . Congress.”
98
 The Electoral 
College and winner-take-all elections have allowed Presidents such as President 
George W. Bush and President Trump to win elections without winning the pop-
ular vote. Accordingly, Presidents are likely to cater to their winning coalitions 
and have little incentive to expand their coalition beyond the necessary mini-
mum.
99
 Even when the President has a national coalition, the difficulty of de-
manding justifications for presidential actions and the lack of meaningful choices 
in presidential elections tend to erode accountability for any particular policy.
100
 
After all, the President and Vice President are the only elected members of the 
executive branch, and they do not face reelection concerns during the second 
term. 
Moreover, the Founders did not intend for trade policy to favor purely ma-
joritarian interests. Instead, the Founders intended for trade policy to serve the 
American public through the protection of regional interests, even when those 
interests were in the minority. Defending the supermajoritarian treaty require-
ment in Federalist 64, John Jay, writing as Publius, argued that “the good of the 
whole can only be promoted by advancing the good of each of the parts or mem-
bers which compose the whole.”
101
 Publius’s theory was that the high bar for 
treaties would prevent one region’s economic interests from dominating an-
other’s. The President, however, unlike a Senate composed of representatives of 
all the states, cannot adequately reflect all regional interests. The shift toward 
less congressional involvement has thus abandoned the original understanding 
of treaties, which were supposed to be difficult to pass since they allowed a mi-
nority who would experience a concentrated harm to object.
102
 
Finally, presidential control of foreign affairs lacks many of the accountability 
mechanisms available in other contexts. Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith 
point out that similar arguments about executive-branch efficiency are made in 
the context of administrative law, but executive agencies have long faced criti-
cism about their accountability.
103
 To address these concerns, Congress has con-
 
98. Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
1217, 1217 (2006); see id. at 1232-46. 
99. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS 42-46 (1962). 
100. See Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. 
L. REV. 2073 (2005). 
101. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 16, at 363; see Adkins & Grewal, supra note 19, at 1505. 
102. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 191 (2005) (characterizing 
Article II’s supermajoritarian requirement as a safeguard for regional minorities). 
103. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 17, at 1281; see also Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in 
the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 441 (2003) (citing Ralph Nader’s criticism of 
agencies as having failed to promote public safety and as subject to regulatory capture). 
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strained executive power in administrative law and created opportunities for ju-
dicial review.
104
 Because international law lacks such constraints and infor-
mation about the effects of presidential control is scarce, Congress may struggle 
to determine which constraints to employ.
105
 
Although executive accountability has long been absent from U.S. trade pol-
icy and past Presidents have taken significant unilateral action on trade, the un-
orthodox Trump Presidency has thrown this lack of oversight into sharp relief. 
Many of President Trump’s actions on trade—such as attempting to renegotiate 
trade deals,
106
 imposing protectionist tariffs,
107
 and threatening to withdraw 
from the World Trade Organization
108
—appear designed to appeal to his elec-
toral base rather than serve the national interest. These actions threaten irrepa-
rable damage to the international trade system and America’s diplomatic rela-
tionships, jeopardizing long-term economic growth.
109
 These policies are also 
highly unlikely to deliver redistribution to the President’s base.
110
 Although re-
distribution was the purported motivation for these actions, support among 
President Trump’s base remains high, and he may win reelection.
111
 Increased 
congressional influence would increase the ability to inform the public about this 
disconnect between what a President might promise and then subsequently fail 
to deliver. 
 
104. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
105. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 17, at 1281-82. 
106. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum & Glenn Thrush, Trump’s Day of Hardball and Confusion on 
Nafta, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/us/politics/trump 
-says-he-will-renegotiate-nafta-or-terminate-it.html [https://perma.cc/Q8AL-9HRB]; Bol-
ton, supra note 65; see also Palmer & McClure, supra note 5 (cataloging trade agreements that 
President Trump has broken or threatened to break). 
107. See sources cited supra note 5. 
108. E.g., Jonathan Swan, Scoop: Trump’s Private Threat to Upend Global Trade, AXIOS (June 29, 
2018), https://www.axios.com/trump-threat-withdraw-wto-world-trade-organization 
-f6ca180e-47d6-42aa-a3a3-f3228e97d715.html [https://perma.cc/M7WD-3MWZ]. 
109. WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 6, at 35-36; Boumans & Krolage, supra note 6. 
110. Bomey, supra note 7; Imbert, supra note 7; Wiener-Bronner, supra note 7. 
111. See Heather Long & Scott Clement, Trump Voters Hit Hard by Tariffs are Standing by Him—for 
Now, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (July 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/2018/07/12/trump-voters-hit-hard-by-tariffs-are-standing-by-him-now [https://perma.cc
/S62U-BBB6]; see also Nelson D. Schwartz, Tariffs Trim a Factory’s Profit, but Loyalty to Trump 
Endures, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/business 
/economy/trade-factory-trump.html [https://perma.cc/YQ25-MQM6] (describing the view 
among Americans harmed by President Trump’s trade policies that personal sacrifice is worth 
“what’s best” for the national economy). 
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From both a policy and an accountability perspective, these decisions are 
deeply troubling. Today, it is clear that powerful executives are largely not subject 
to checks in trade. President Trump has promised outcomes through policies 
that experts agree will produce the opposite effects. Even if President Trump 
does not win reelection or a subsequent President reverses his policies, the inter-
national trade system and the U.S. economy will likely suffer long-term dam-
age.
112
 A policy-making process that allows these outcomes cannot be demo-
cratic or just. The system must build the political will for policies that actually 
respond to voters’ desires. 
i i i .  reforming trade policy making 
The pathologies in the trade policy-making system have led to policies in-
consistent with worker preferences. As a result, Americans have opposed inter-
national trade or resigned themselves to harmful executive policies unchecked 
by Congress. This Part proposes a different way forward. To build broader sup-
port for trade policy that is democratically accountable, Congress should create 
a nonpartisan, independent advisory body for trade policy analysis: COTA. The 
secondary benefits of this body may include the formation of better trade deals 
ex ante while also supporting the development of redistribution and active labor-
management policies ex post. This proposal draws on congressional-support 
bodies such as the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and CBO. 
Through these bodies, Congress has been able to enhance its capacity and en-
gage the public in understanding how policy connects to outcomes. A similar 
body for international trade has the potential to give Congress more influence in 
trade negotiations and enhance democratic accountability. 
Although information alone will not solve the democratic deficit in trade pol-
icy making, the body I propose is an important step in building the political will 
for ensuring that such policy making is accountable and equitable. This advisory 
body could galvanize the public behind sound, equitable trade policy, putting 
external pressure on Congress to rein in the executive branch’s excesses and re-
distribute the economic gains from trade. 
 
112. See Peter Coy, Trump’s Damage to International Trade Will Take Years to Repair, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (July 19, 2018, 4:00 AM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2018-07-19/trump-s-damage-to-international-trade-will-take-years-to-repair; Kyle Hand-
ley, Here’s the Real Economic Damage from Trump’s Growing Trade ‘Cold War,’ CNBC (Mar. 14, 
2018, 3:35 PM ET), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/14/trumps-trade-cold-war-will-have 
-disastrous-economic-consequences-commentary.html [https://perma.cc/22VA-DKBL]. 
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A. Current Redistribution Policy’s Limits 
Attempts to redistribute trade-policy gains have focused on the policy’s con-
sequences rather than incorporating redistribution mechanisms into the trade-
policy system itself. Since its creation in 1962, the TAA program has been the 
primary form of compensating workers for trade-related harms. Groups of three 
or more workers employed by the same firm who lose or expect to lose their jobs 
because of import competition can apply to the Secretary of Labor for benefits.
113
 
The Secretary then determines whether the workers are eligible for benefits, 
such as worker training, wage, and relocations supports.
114
 
Yet Congress has failed to provide adequate support for TAA. The TAA pro-
gram is persistently underfunded
115
 and has to be periodically renewed (unlike 
the trade deals whose effects it is intended to mitigate).
116
 Despite intensifying 
pressures on workers,
117
 during the most recent reauthorization in 2015 Con-
gress reduced the statutory cap on TAA funding for reemployment services from 
$575 million per year to $450 million per year.
118
 Compared to other developed 
countries, the United States funds adjustment assistance at much lower levels 
and spends less of those funds on effective policies.
119
 Moreover, TAA may not 
work very well as an employment program.
120
 Some research suggests that TAA 
 
113. 19 U.S.C. § 2271(a) (2018). 
114. Id. § 2272. 
115. Frank J. Garcia & Timothy Meyer, Restoring Trade’s Social Contract, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 
78, 90 (2018). 
116. Timothy Meyer, Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade, 70 VAND. L. REV. 985, 1011 
(2017). 
117. See, e.g., Autor et al., supra note 2, at 206 (discussing difficulties in low-skill employment and 
pay prospects). 
118. Emp’t & Training Admin., Side-by-Side Comparison of TAA Program Benefits Under the 2002 
Program, 2009 Program, 2011 Program, and 2015 Program, U.S. DEP’T LAB. 2 (Nov. 9, 2015), 
https://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/pdf/side-by-side.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5FS-7KQC]. 
119. See David Card et al., What Works? A Meta Analysis of Recent Active Labor Market Program 
Evaluations (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21431 2015), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w21431.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ASU-TJWF]; Active Labour 
Market Policies: Connecting People with Jobs, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/employment/activation.htm [https://perma.cc/37ME-Y56U]. 
120. TAA may be more successful as a compensation program. See Tom DiChristopher, Sizing Up 
the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program, CNBC (June 26, 2015, 1:54 PM ET), https://www
.cnbc.com/2015/06/26/is-aid-to-trade-displaced-workers-worth-the-cost.html [https://
perma.cc/4JSB-SJKF]. 
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Scholars have proposed policies to improve TAA and redistribute the gains 
from trade, such as improving the administrative process to apply for and receive 
TAA benefits,
122
 expanding TAA benefits and funding these benefits through a 
financial-transactions tax,
123
 and requiring developed countries to address do-
mestic inequality in future trade agreements.
124
 One could also imagine a system 
that taxes the winners from trade and transfers those gains to the losers.
125
 
Each of these policies proposes redistribution but fails to address why this 
redistribution has not occurred. TAA’s failure demonstrates that postnegotiation 
redistribution will never fully address workers’ needs. TAA receives support 
from both antitrade and protrade legislators.
126
 Yet its persistent underfunding 
suggests the current system produces symbolic restitution rather than adequate 
compensation. A true commitment to American workers, as opposed to political 
expediency, would entail much more generous benefits for individuals and ef-
forts to promote economic development in communities affected by trade. Such 
efforts would likely include both monetary support and active government ef-
forts to promote a healthy labor market. Empirical evidence suggests that active 
labor-management programs—such as job training, job-search assistance, and 
subsidized employment—can effectively reduce unemployment.
127
 However, 
Congress currently lacks the incentives to pass such programs or otherwise in-
crease its efforts to mitigate the negative effects of trade policy after its adoption 
 
121. See Sarah Dolfin & Peter Z. Schochet, Estimated Impacts for Participants in the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance (TAA) Program Under the 2002 Amendments, MATHEMATICA POL’Y RES., at i-ii (2012), 
https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/download-media?MediaItemId={7AFC8CC7-63C8 
-454C-A92C-57D5828EA1BA} [https://perma.cc/K2KZ-XB3W]; see also Kara M. Reynolds & 
John S. Palatucci, Does Trade Adjustment Assistance Make a Difference?, 30 CONTEMP. ECON. 
POL’Y 43 (2011) (finding that, on average, TAA had no discernible impact on the employment 
outcomes of the TAA beneficiaries within the dataset). 
122. See, e.g., William J. Mateikis, The Fair Track to Expanded Free Trade: Making TAA Benefits More 
Accessible to American Workers, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 50-60 (2007). 
123. See, e.g., Garcia & Meyer, supra note 115, at 87-89, 93. 
124. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 116, at 1014-20 (proposing that trade agreements include binding 
commitments to increase spending on economic development that benefits those dislocated 
by the agreement). 
125. A general tax-and-transfer policy may not gain as much public support as one that is perceived 
to serve a corrective purpose. See Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive 
Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1105 (2016). 
126. See Stephanie J. Rickard, Compensating the Losers: An Examination of Congressional Votes on 
Trade Adjustment Assistance, 41 INT’L INTERACTIONS 46, 49 (2015). 
127. See Card et al., supra note 119. 
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because the public lacks reliable knowledge about the scope of the redistribution 
problem and how Congress can address it effectively. Accordingly, the public 
cannot easily hold Congress accountable for failing to address redistribution. 
This problem indicates not only a lack of political will, but also a structural fail-
ure in the trade policy-making system to produce that will. 
To enhance democratic accountability and effectively redistribute the gains 
from trade consistent with popular desires, we must implement structural 
changes to our current system. For Congress to have the knowledge to balance 
redistribution and growth, it must be able to rely on objective, trustworthy an-
alysis about the distributional effects of trade. For Congress to have the incentive 
to balance redistribution and growth, the Washington apparatus of think tanks, 
academic institutions, advocacy groups, and the media must have reliable, 
trusted analysis. By sharing analysis with the public, these groups could encour-
age voters to act in their rational best interests, pressuring Congress to address 
their concerns rather than offer empty promises.
128
 Analysis would also em-
power certain members of Congress to demand significant mitigation and create 
an incentive for political parties to support redistribution in order to attract vot-
ers. 
B. Precedents for a Congressional Office on Trade Analysis 
A new congressional-support agency that independently analyzes and eval-
uates trade policy could reshape the trade policy-making process. The benefits 
of such an agency are evident from the histories of the JCT and CBO, which were 




1. The Creation of the JCT and CBO 
The JCT is an important source of nonpartisan tax analysis for Congress. 
Prior to the creation of the JCT, the Department of the Treasury leveraged its 
access to data, superior expertise, and large professional staff to direct the tax 
 
128. Rho & Tomz, supra note 79; see PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 353-54 (discussing a sche-
matic model for demonstrating the various pathways by which public opinion is influenced); 
Boudreau & MacKenzie, supra note 44; Bullock, supra note 44. 
129. See Carol H. Weiss, Congressional Committees as Users of Analysis, 8 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 
411, 417 (1989); George K. Yin, Codification of the Tax Law and the Emergence of the Staff of the 
Joint Committee on Taxation 3-4 (Va. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 2017-20, Va. Pub. Law 
& Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2017-39, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3008878. 




 Congress, with its limited resources, was in the unenvia-
ble position of “mak[ing] somewhat uninformed choices between the Treasury’s 
position on proposed legislation and those of the private sector.”
131
 One senator 
expressed concern that members of Congress were often “mere rubber stamps” 
for the Treasury’s preferred policies.
132
 Over time, the JCT has evolved to be-
come an independent source of ideas and information about tax legislation.
133
 
CBO also arose out of a desire to check presidential power in spending. Re-
sponding to the financial burdens of World War I, Congress delegated the power 
to propose and submit an annual budget to the President.
134
 To aid the President, 
the Act created the Bureau of the Budget, later renamed the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB).
135
 This delegation ceded significant spending control 
to the President, who could now set the domestic agenda through his budget.
136
 
Eventually, this led to executive/congressional friction over spending.
137
 In an 
effort to reclaim power in budgeting, Congress introduced a congressional 
budget that would compete with the President’s in the Congressional Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
138
 To give Congress the capacity to for-
mulate this budget, the Act created CBO.
139
 CBO estimates the budgetary effects 





130. Yin, supra note 129, at 39-40. 
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§ 201, 42 Stat. 20, 20-21 (1921)). 
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of the Budget to OMB, and the transfer of that office from the Department of the Treasury to 
the Executive Office of the President). 
136. See SHUMAN, supra note 135, at 24-25. 
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223-24 (6th ed. 2014) (describing a series of skirmishes between the Nixon Administration 
and Congress over impoundments). 
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140. Id. 
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The state of our trade policy-making system resembles that of spending and 
tax policies prior to the institution of these congressional-support bodies. Con-
gress is at a disadvantage relative to the President in trade policy and lacks the 
information and expertise required to monitor the executive branch. This has 
occurred because Congress has delegated much of its appointed power and ab-
dicated responsibility for this area of law. However, the experience of the JCT 
and CBO also demonstrates that Congress can reclaim the initiative. 
2. Lessons from the JCT and CBO 
Congress’s experience with the JCT and CBO suggests that a similar body 
providing technical advice on trade could (1) reduce its reliance on the executive 
branch for information and (2) promote democratic accountability. The JCT has 
transformed the tax-policy landscape, and CBO is one of the major successes of 
the 1974 Budget Act. By giving Congress and the public an independent source 
of information and policy analysis, the JCT and CBO have leveled the playing 
field between the executive and legislative branches on domestic issues. 
Several factors have contributed to this success, and an effort to create a sim-
ilar body for trade should replicate these factors. First, the work produced by the 
JCT and CBO is viewed as high-quality and nonpartisan.
141
 Accordingly, mem-
bers of Congress and their staff have felt comfortable relying on them. Second, 
the JCT and CBO have expanded Congress’s technical capacity, allowing Con-
gress to rely on their analysis rather than the executive’s.
142
 Third, both organi-
zations have access to information and data from across the federal government, 
including executive-branch agencies.
143
 Finally, the JCT and CBO are trusted 




Perhaps most importantly, the JCT and CBO have also promoted democratic 
accountability. Although Congress’s primary motivation in creating them was to 
increase its power over the executive branch, their creation engaged the public 
 
141. See SHUMAN, supra note 135, at 288 (“[CBO] has gained strength and credibility not only for 
the accuracy of its estimates but for the independence of its analysis and boldness and audacity 
of its presentation of budget alternatives. Whatever the criticisms, the annual cost of the 
agency is about the best and most productive [money] the government spends.”); Yin, supra 
note 129, at 38-39. 
142. See Yin, supra note 129, at 41-45. 
143. See 2 U.S.C. § 601(d)-(e); I.R.C. § 8023 (2018). 
144. See PHILIP G. JOYCE, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE: HONEST NUMBERS, POWER, AND 
POLICYMAKING 209-10 (2011); Yin, supra note 129, at 44. 
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in policy debates. Because the JCT and CBO make much of their analyses pub-
lic,
145
 they serve as sources of public information about the mainstream view on 
the budget and its economic effects. In particular, they transform complicated 
policy proposals into digestible information. For example, the JCT played a crit-
ical role in the public’s understanding of the 2017 Republican tax plan.
146
 Its 




Public-facing analysis of policy proposals can also affect political outcomes 
by putting external pressure on Congress. For example, CBO’s analysis contrib-
uted to the demise of President Clinton’s health-care reforms.
148
 CBO deter-
mined that the plan would increase the deficit and showed that controversial as-
pects of the plan had a budgetary impact, allowing opponents to characterize it 
as an unwelcome federal expansion into health care.
149
 More recently, CBO re-
leased analyses of the health plans proposed by President Trump and congres-
sional Republicans in 2017. Those estimates suggested that upwards of twenty 
million Americans would lose health insurance over the next ten years and that 
premiums would increase.
150
 These estimates galvanized public opposition 
against the bills and led to their rejection in the Senate.
151
 In particular, these 
trustworthy estimates—amplified by media coverage—mobilized advocacy 
groups, think tanks, and academic institutions to force Congress to grapple with 
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the bills’ trade-offs. If trade policies were subject to similarly rigorous analysis, 
the public would better understand their potential effects and be able to put pres-
sure on Congress and the President to adopt policies beneficial to workers, who 
compose the vast majority of the voting public. 
C. A Proposal for Reform: The Congressional Office on Trade Analysis 
To balance the branches’ decision-making authority in international trade 
and facilitate public dialogue of trade’s effects, I propose that Congress commis-
sion a professional, independent, nonpartisan staff of experts to advise members 
on trade issues. This body, COTA, would estimate the economic effects of inter-
national commercial agreements and other areas of trade policy. These estimates 
would help achieve the goal of enhancing democratic accountability. In addition, 
COTA could lead to better trade policies ex ante and more effective redistribution 
ex post. 
1. COTA’s Operations 
COTA would (1) advise Congress on proposed trade policies; (2) obtain in-
formation from the executive; (3) keep USTR honest; and (4) respond proac-
tively to congressional needs. In each of these areas, COTA’s operations would 
resemble the JCT’s and CBO’s functions. 
a. Advising Congress 
COTA would analyze proposed executive actions on trade. When the execu-
tive pursues a particular trade policy—whether negotiating an agreement, im-
posing tariffs, exiting an existing agreement, or bringing an action against an-
other country for trade violations—COTA economists would conduct an 
independent quantitative analysis of the proposed action. Estimated effects 
would include outcomes like job gains and losses in different industries, changes 
to consumer prices, and total distributional impacts. Though initial estimates 
are likely to be rough, they would at least provide a directional estimate, and 
with adequate funding and the right personnel, COTA would build expertise 
over time. In addition to this quantitative analysis, COTA lawyers and policy 
experts could provide a qualitative analysis of the trade policies at issue. 
This process would be iterative and involve multiple consultations between 
Congress and COTA. Congress would consult with COTA to determine what 
policies would result in desired outcomes, much the way it consults with the JCT 
and CBO on domestic policy. For example, while USTR is negotiating with its 
international counterparts, COTA could work with the agency to understand the 
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emerging contours of the agreement. COTA could then develop and disseminate 
early positions on draft language as it emerges, and update its analysis through-
out the decision-making process. By increasing the availability of reliable infor-
mation to Congress, these analyses could lead to better trade policies ex ante. 
COTA would also examine legislation intended to address trade’s distribu-
tional problems. COTA would evaluate congressional proposals to mitigate any 
negative effects of the proposed trade policies or to redistribute gains from trade. 
These efforts might include expansions of TAA, workforce development pro-
grams, tax credits, subsidies, or other policies. When these efforts intersect with 
spending and tax policy, COTA would work with the JCT and CBO to under-
stand their budgetary impact, while COTA would focus on estimating the effects 
on jobs and consumer prices. COTA could therefore help Congress tailor its re-
distributive solutions ex post to ensure they are sufficient to address the prob-
lems created by trade policy. 
b. Obtaining Information from the Executive Branch 
To create meaningful estimates, COTA would need access to executive-
branch data and information. Congress granted the JCT and CBO statutory au-
thority to obtain information from federal agencies, which are required to supply 
this information.
152
 Replicating the success of these bodies would require COTA 
to have similar powers. Accordingly, Congress should require USTR to disclose 
necessary information to COTA. To ensure compliance, Congress could also im-




Limited disclosures may suffice when it is difficult to ensure compliance with 
disclosure requirements. USTR could still use confidentiality requirements or 
national-security classifications to restrict access or limit disclosures. All COTA 
needs is enough information to serve its intended function, rather than all rele-
vant information from the executive branch. If the penalty were strong enough 
to induce compliance and COTA had access to the necessary information (even 
if not all members of Congress did), then limited disclosures could still be effec-
tive. 
 
152. 2 U.S.C. § 601(d)-(e) (2018); I.R.C. § 8023 (2018). 
153. Presumably the chair and ranking member of the relevant committees—such as the Senate 
Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee or their subcommittees on 
trade—would have the power to activate this trigger. To provide a check on this authority, 
Congress also could include an override of such a trigger by some subset of Congress. 
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c. Keeping USTR Honest 
When USTR produces its own estimates of the effects of its trade policies, 
COTA could play an important role by influencing this analysis. Independent 
congressional bodies can provide a check on executive agencies by providing an 
alternative source of analysis. In the domestic context, both OMB and CBO es-
timate budgetary effects. This helps keep OMB, the executive body, honest. As 
Philip Joyce explains, “CBO has substantially influenced OMB because it creates 
bounds for OMB analysis . . . . If OMB is going to be substantially different from 
CBO on any issue, there has to be a good reason why.”
154
 A well-functioning 
COTA would play a similar role by providing a comparison point. USTR and 
COTA might agree in some circumstances, but given the critical role that con-
gressional-support agencies play in keeping federal agencies honest, similar re-
sults might in fact be an indication that COTA was working effectively to con-
strain the executive branch. 
d. Responding to Congressional Needs 
For COTA to be most effective, it should anticipate and satisfy the needs of 
members of Congress and their staff.
155
 When not analyzing trade agreements 
or other executive proposals, COTA could play a proactive role in shaping trade 
policy by responding to congressional requests for analyses of policies that it is 
considering. COTA could also affirmatively produce analyses that explore long-
term, big-picture policy options. CBO founding director Alice Rivlin wanted to 
ensure that the organization conducted this type of analysis, and organized CBO 
to promote “longer-range thinking.”
156
 COTA could similarly create a division 
that prioritizes this kind of analysis. To encourage flexibility, COTA should have 
a broad mandate to analyze trade policies and discretion to adapt as necessary. 
2. COTA’s Benefits 
COTA would encourage congressional and public involvement in trade pol-
icy making, mitigating the negative effects of fast-track authority and ex post 
 
154. JOYCE, supra note 144, at 210. 
155. Congressional-support agencies generally view congressional members and staff as their cli-
ents and entrepreneurially identify ways to engage them through strategies such as providing 
useful resources, fulfilling congressional requests, and holding seminars. See Weiss, supra note 
129, at 419. 
156. JOYCE, supra note 144, at 22-23. 
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ratification while maintaining many of their benefits, such as efficiency. The 
President would continue to lead trade negotiations, but Congress would have a 
greater opportunity for involvement earlier in the process. Although existing 
processes may increase presidential leverage over Congress, restructuring the 
trade policy-making process itself could constrain the executive.
157
 
The public dissemination of COTA’s analysis would inform the public about 
trade policy’s distributional and economic effects, allowing the American public 
to pressure Congress to provide a trade regime consistent with its policy prefer-
ences. Relying on COTA’s expertise, Congress would have the knowledge to act 
accordingly. This increased availability of information to Congress and the pub-
lic would consequently increase democratic accountability. Through these mech-
anisms, COTA would lead to trade policies ex ante that are aligned with popular 
desires, while also encouraging redistributive efforts ex post. Although in cases 
involving national security COTA might wait to release detailed analyses to the 
public until after negotiations have concluded, Congress could still benefit from 
the advice and expertise of COTA in early discussions about substance. 
COTA addresses issues that other proposals fail to because it systematically 
creates the circumstances for the political will necessary to overcome congres-
sional partisanship and deference to the executive. In essence, COTA creates a 
mechanism for collective deliberation.
158
 With its analysis, COTA would fore-
ground trade’s distributional effects and mitigation efforts. If COTA found that 
trade policies would negatively affect a significant number of Americans, or 
workers in particular geographies, the media would report on the estimates. 
Think tanks and academic institutions could then debate and validate the esti-
mates, while advocacy groups could use the information to help voters under-
stand the implications of the policies. The political branches would then be un-
der pressure to adopt mitigating policies. A nonpartisan trusted source providing 
more transparency would thereby help the public hold Congress and the execu-
tive accountable for the policies they supported. Political science research finds 
that voters can better defend their interests when trusted opinion leaders clearly 
 
157. Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
143, 169-80 (1992) (describing how fast-track authority gives the President leverage over the 
substance of trade policy and how it might be modified to increase congressional involvement 
in trade policy making). 
158. See PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 363-65 (articulating the need for dissemination of infor-
mation for collective deliberation on public policy). 
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explain and simplify the complex consequences of policy.
159
 By mobilizing a pol-
icy apparatus around trade, more information thus helps provide greater demo-
cratic accountability. 
With an active Congress, involved public, and increased information, COTA 
could ultimately bring about more equitable trade agreements and policies ex 
ante and more effective redistributive efforts ex post. Congress would have sub-
stantive reasons to reject harmful policies because a more informed public pro-
vides legislators the political cover to oppose the executive branch. An executive 
wary of legislative failure to ratify an agreement or reversal of harmful policies 
would be more reluctant to propose trade policy likely to result in job losses or 
skewed distributional outcomes without a plan to mitigate those results. Broad 
distribution of COTA’s analysis could provide an access point for those repre-
senting American workers and small businesses. These groups could propose 
legislation to mitigate the negative effects of trade, and COTA’s evaluation of 
these proposals could lead to the adoption of effective jobs policies such as active 
labor-management policies used in other countries. More transparency for 
members of Congress, their staff, and the staff of COTA could thereby ensure 
decision makers are informed and provide a counterweight to corporate influ-
ence during trade negotiations. 
COTA could also help Congress oversee USTR by providing additional re-
search and analysis.
160
 Congressional staff have expressed frustration at the fact 
that USTR briefings are “one-way.”
161
 They have also mentioned that USTR 
often offers reports late in the process or on the last business day before officials 
leave for the next round of negotiations, which prevents substantive input.
162
 
Rather than relying on USTR or industry, Congress would have its own source 
of analysis, which could help satisfy legislators’ desire for influence in trade. A 
similar desire for analysis and influence independent of the executive branch and 
private industry justified the creation of both CBO and the JCT. COTA could 




159. Id.; see also Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in 
California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994) (arguing that, rather 
than fully educating the public about policy choices, the provision of information “signals” or 
“shortcuts” “may be a more efficient and cost-effective way” to promote rational voting). 
160. See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 50. 
161. Id. at 43. 
162. Id. at 44. 
163. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
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Some may wonder whether extensive public disclosures are wise. However, 
the need for secrecy in trade is likely overstated.
164
 Moreover, even if we accept 
the importance of secrecy in some areas of trade policy, additional public disclo-
sure and analysis need not mean the end of secrecy in all situations. When gen-
uine national-security interests are at stake, COTA could delay public disclosures 
until after the negotiating process much as CBO does.
165
 For example, Congress 
could limit USTR’s disclosures of negotiating positions and strategies to COTA 
(rather than members who might have political reasons to leak), while still mak-
ing draft language and COTA’s analyses available to members and limiting pub-
lic disclosure. As discussed above, secrecy may not be necessary to promote 
agreement in many circumstances, and COTA need not diminish secrecy when 
it does matter for negotiations. 
Although COTA is not a comprehensive fix to trade policy making, it would 
give Congress the tools necessary to repair our broken system. By precommitting 
to consider objective estimates of the economic effects of trade policy, Congress 
could create the circumstances for sound policy making. Enacting COTA might 
seem like an uphill battle, but Congress has proven itself capable of similar re-
forms with the creation of bodies such as the JCT and CBO.
166
 
3. Strengthening Existing Institutions Is Insufficient 
One potential criticism of COTA is that it is a new institution. Why create 
something new, one might ask, when strengthening existing institutions like 
USTR or the Senate Subcommittee on Trade might suffice? The answer is that 
these alternatives to COTA do not, and cannot, address the structural issues with 
trade policy making that this Comment identifies. First, congressional commit-
tees are not equipped to provide objective, comprehensive analysis. Second, an 
office within the executive branch remains subject to presidential capture and 
industry lobbying. Finally, expanding the mandate of existing congressional-
support organizations into trade policy would dilute their missions and confuse 
their priorities. 
 
164. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text. 
165. See 2 U.S.C. § 603(c) (2018). 
166. See supra Section III.B; see also KOH, supra note 22, at 185-89 (describing the conditions nec-
essary for enacting ambitious framework legislation). 
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a. Congressional Committees 
One alternative to COTA that might be proposed is the expansion of com-
mittee staff, such as the staff of the Senate Subcommittee on Trade. However, 
this reform would not close the congressional information gap. Congress tends 
to rely on congressional-support agencies—such as CBO—for information and 
to “translate objective analysis into politically relevant recommendations.”
167
 
Congress has taken this approach because information from committee staff is 
often tainted by partisanship and split loyalties. Although some committees have 
nonpartisan staff, the committees with primary jurisdiction over trade issues—
the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee—are 
not among them. The Finance and Ways and Means Committees do not have 
one “staff” but two: majority- and minority-party staffs that typically do not 
share information with each other.
168
 Moreover, some committee staff serve at 
the pleasure of more junior members rather than the leadership of the commit-
tee. Although these staffers nominally work on committee business, they sit 
within the member’s personal office and are presumptively loyal to that mem-
ber.
169
 Because this approach shoehorns a technocratic function into a political 
enterprise, it would not provide objective, comprehensive analysis about the 
likely effects of trade policy necessary to inform Congress and provide a coun-
terweight to information from the executive branch and special interests. 
b. Executive-Branch Agencies 
Another approach might be to create an “office of goodness” within USTR 
that keeps Congress informed about the executive’s trade policy. Congress has 
created similar offices in the past when it sought to instill certain values within 
an agency. However, such an approach would not promote congressional deci-
sion-making in trade because the office would be in danger of executive capture. 
Although the purpose of such an office would be to constrain the agency, the 
reality is that offices within the executive branch are subject to influence by the 
President and the colleagues they are supposed to monitor. An office within 
USTR, which is part of the Executive Office of the President, would likely be 
subject to significant pressure. As Margo Schlanger has argued, staff within ex-
ecutive-branch offices are under collegial and careerist pressure that can cause 
“offices of goodness” to lose their commitment to the values they are supposed 
 
167. Weiss, supra note 129, at 417. 
168. Id. at 414-15. 
169. Id. at 415. 




 A proposed office within USTR would similarly be subject to pres-
sure from other employees of the organization who are committed to serving the 
President and executing trade deals. 
Because one of the major issues facing Congress is a lack of objective analysis 
about trade, and Congress has historically been skeptical of the veracity of infor-
mation from executive agencies, this approach would struggle to solve the prob-
lems this Comment identifies. Because COTA would serve as a congressional-
support body, it would be better aligned with Congress itself and therefore be 
viewed as more credible and independent of executive-branch influence. The 
JCT and CBO were able to help Congress regain the initiative in domestic policy 
making because they were trusted sources that provided balance to executive-
branch entities. An office within USTR likely would not be able to perform the 
same function. It is notable that an office intended primarily to inform Congress 
would be sui generis. Although there are relatively independent offices within 
federal agencies, these offices serve roles related to the agencies’ missions. To the 
extent they conduct oversight or provide information to external sources such as 
Congress, it is in furtherance of that mission. 
One could also imagine an expanded advisory role for the U.S. International 
Trade Commission (USITC).
171
 After all, the USITC is an independent, quasi-
judicial agency with a bipartisan leadership that already conducts economic and 
industry analysis.
172
 However, the USITC is subject to presidential influence 
since the President appoints the Commissioners.
173
 Moreover, the USITC will 
not be able to serve the same “checking” function as a purely congressional body 
like CBO. Finally, the USITC’s primary role is regulatory rather than advisory. 
For example, it conducts trade investigations on issues such as dumping and ad-
judicates intellectual property disputes. Expanding its analysis and advisory role 
may detract from these other aspects of its mission. Although the data and an-
alysis that the USITC produces can be useful to members of Congress, Congress 
as a whole will best be able to increase its influence if it can rely on its own trusted 
source. 
 
170. Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 
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c. Existing Congressional-Support Organizations 
Expanding the mission of an existing congressional-support organization 
like CBO would lead to mission creep and create jurisdictional issues within 
Congress.
174
 Expanding the mission of an existing organization designed for a 
specific purpose may negatively affect its ability to carry out its current duties. 
The organization’s structure and culture may also be poorly equipped to support 
the new function. For example, CBO primarily focuses on budget issues, and 
adding trade duties may distract it from this work. A Congress determined to 
expand capacity within existing bodies could earmark significant funds to de-
velop trade-analysis capabilities, but the advantage of such an approach is un-
clear. Moreover, placing COTA’s proposed duties within an organization like 
CBO could create jurisdictional issues. Although CBO serves the entire Con-
gress, its primary duty is to serve the budget committee of each chamber.
175
 
COTA’s duties, however, fall primarily within the jurisdiction of the Senate Fi-
nance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee. Housing a trade 
function within CBO would therefore create a situation in which reporting lines 
for CBO are unclear. This lack of clarity could lead to conflicts within Congress 
for CBO’s resources or result in CBO deprioritizing trade policy. 
conclusion 
Independent, nonpartisan analysis of international trade will not solve all 
problems that ail America’s trade policy. But it is an essential first step toward 
much-needed reform. 
It is important to recognize that COTA will not guarantee congressional sup-
port for broad distribution of trade benefits or the prioritization of public over 
private interests. To provide an effective counterweight to an executive branch 
that has pursued trade policies that serve elite corporate interests, Congress must 
be willing to take on the role of coequal branch. As Louis Fisher wrote of inter-
branch conflicts in foreign policy, “Congress may stand against the President or 
it may stand behind him, but it should not stand aside . . . . [T]he crucial ingre-
dient is willpower, not constitutional power.”
176
 COTA can only be as effective 
as Congress wants it to be. 
 
174. If Congress were to place COTA’s proposed duties within an existing congressional-support 
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expertise in rapid, quantitative analysis. 
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Nevertheless, COTA is the first step on the road to creating effective inter-
branch checks on trade policy. Moreover, broader and increased participation in 
trade through increased dissemination of information will give legitimacy to a 
system that suffers from a democratic deficit. After the demise of the TPP and 
the election of President Trump, proponents of free trade have wondered what 
the future holds for America’s place in the global economy. No single answer will 
be appropriate for every situation. Trade policy making should instead incorpo-
rate public deliberation and sound analysis of its economic and distributional 
trade-offs. Without a process to create democratic support for international 
trade, the United States risks retrenchment from the world, rather than active 
engagement with it. 
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